WORLD LAW
CONTINUITY IN THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
HUGO J. HAHN*
"De fine non est consilium, sed solum de his, quae sunt ad finem." S. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II, 14, 2 (Editio Leonina tom. VI, p. xo6).

PART TWO:
CONTINUITY FROM OEEC TO OECDt
BEFoRE discussing the legal nature of the transition from the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a brief
examination of the history of the OEEC seems appropriate, since
that institution has during its lifetime made, practically without interruption, successful efforts to cope with the problem of continuity by way
of constitutional and administrative adaptation.
I
THE OEEC IN RETROSPEcr

The history of the OEEC consists of a series of reforms which
transformed that body from a post-war distributor of American aid
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into .a robust multinational entity acting in pursuit of a multiple objective in the economic field. This objective was so diversified that
in the second half of 1958 when the OEEC was already seized with
the then insoluble controversy between the Six and the Seven, its field
of activity could be described as "economic matters in a broad sense of
the term."' The salvation of Europe from its postwar "money
muddle"2 was accomplished by the OEEC through three kinds of
devices which were employed by the Council of OEEC or under its
authority by subsidiary organs of the organisations. They were: IntraEuropean Payments and Compensation Agreements, the European
Payments Union (EPU) and the European Monetary Agreement
(EMA).3

Following the termination of the first Agreement on Multilateral
Monetary Compensation of November 18, I947, 4 a portion of "Marshall
Aid" for 1948-50 was granted in the form of "conditional aid" to
certain countries on condition that they grant an equivalent amount
of drawing rights to their European debtors. The beneficiaries of
drawing rights were relieved from payment obligations for a corresponding amount of imports from the countries which had granted
them. The granters of drawing rights, on the other hand, were compensated by an equivalent amount of dollar aid from the United
States. The legal mechanics of this first attempt at dismantling bilateralism in the field of intra-European payments were provided for
in the Agreements for Intra-European Payments and Compensations
of October i6, 1948,' and September 7, 1949,' the OEEC having
entered into life on April i6, 19487
'Elkin, 4
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'See OEEC 9 TH ANNUAL REPORT: 4 Decade of Co-operation, Achievements and
Perspectives 75 (958).
' For a concise analysis see Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on U.S. 4ssistance to European Economic Recovery, 8oth Cong., znd Sess., pt. x,
at 51o-x1 (1948). Text in Bulletin de Ligislation Comparie (Ministzre des Finances,
Paris, 1948) at 9x5.
Text in Documents on European Recovery and Defence i i i ( 1 949).
'Text in 6 ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION ADMINISTRATION REPORT TO CONGREsS 81
(July-Sept. 1949).
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The replacement of this timely, but soon worn-out, system by the
EPU was initiated by an agency of the United States Government, the
Economic Co-operation Administration, in December, 1949,8 with the
objective of substituting European co-operation for American aid as a
basis for a broader and more flexible payments system.' Designed to
be an automatic mechanism for a multilateral, although originally
limited, settlement of accounts, the EPUI0 worked as a multilateral
clearing house, which each month registered the payments due from
one country to another in the mutual accounts of the central banks.
The residual balance by each country towards each one of its partners
was communicated to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
which acted as agent for EPU. BIS then cancelled out the claims and
debts accumulated during the month by each country with respect to
all of its partners. Thus, only a single residual claim or debt to EPU
remained, which was settled between each government and EPU. The
second purpose of the EPU was to facilitate the settlement of the
monthly net payments by mutual EPU credits which financed part of
the settlements" while the rest was made in gold, dollars or in currency
acceptable to creditor countries. The third aim of the EPU was to
provide effective consultation on the problems created by extreme
creditor and debtor positions in the Union.
The system had received working capital from the United States
Government in the amount of 350 million dollars. Once started, its
operation did not rely on additional American financial support. It
was able to exist and to finance a large proportion of intra-European
trade without supplementary American aid. Thus conceived, the EPU
was the prime mover towards multilateralism in trade and invisible
transactions. It also helped to overcome the financial crises which
operation of April 16, 1948, which provided for provisional application as from signature.
Text of OEEC Convention at i EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 231 (.955).
S On this initiative cf. TRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16x.
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note 3, at 8o.
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affected Europe in the early 195o's as a result of the Korean war and
other political and economic incidents of a local nature but of Europewide dislocating effect; in addition, it contributed to the improvement
and stabilization of the economies of specific oountries by timely
financial aid measures.12
Administered, under the authority of the Council of the OEEC, by
a Managing Board of seven distinguished financial experts who were
appointed by the Council of the OEEC in a personal capacity on the
nomination of governments, the EPU had no legal personality of its
own but formed part of the operational activities of the OEEC, which
alone could act under international law as well as the municipal law
of the contracting parties.13
The EPU was replaced by the EMA of August 5, 1955,"4 when at
the end of 1958" OEEC members, whose contributions to the European
Fund amounted in the aggregate to more than fifty per cent of the
total amount of contributions provided for in the latter agreement,
declared their currency convertible in different ways. Continuity was
ensured by the transfer of the working capital of the EPU to the
European Fund, the retention of the institutional machinery supplied by
the OEEC-Council, Secretariat and BIS as agent--and the re-appointment of the members of the Managing Board of the EPU as members
of the Board of Management of the EMA.'
The EMA provides essentially for the establishment of a European
Fund and for a multilateral system of settlements, both operated, as
was the execution of the EPU agreement, by a restricted committee,
the Board of Management, under the authority of the OEEC Council.
The Fund is to provide short-term credit of up to two years and to
facilitate the monthly balances between the central banks of member
1 See EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION, FINAL REPORT OF THE MANAGING BOARD,
OEEC, 17-26 (Paris, October 1959).

supra note io, at 832-42.
The text published there was amended
1&3 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 213 (957).
18Huet, op. cit

by Supplementary Protocols Nos. 2, 3 of June 27, 1958, January 15, 196o, and December 13, x961, respectively, OEEC Council Decisions C( 5 9 ) ig, C(59)29 3 (Final),
C(5 9 ) 294. and C(6o)x 4 6(Final) and OECD Council Decision OECD/C(6i) 5 7(Final).
On the legal aspects of the EMA see Huet, i AF 455 (1955) Wabnitz, zo EUROPA
ARCHIV 8237 (1955)5 Mann, supra note io; Elkin, 7 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 148
(x961).
" Cf. THE WORK OF THE ORGANISATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION,
A REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, 29-33 (April 1959); and FINAL REPORT OF
THE EPU MANAGING BOARD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 53-

"8Resolutionof the OEEC Council C(58)z82(Final) of December 30, 1958.
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states. While under the EPU Agreement credit did not require
specific approval of the institutions of the OEEC operating the Union,
credits now may only be granted by the OEEC Council of the organisation on the proposal of the Board of Management.
On the coming into force of the OECD Convention, the EMA continued to operate as before, but within the organisational framework of
the OECD.17
No less wholesome has been the work of the OEEC in the field of
trade and invisible transactions, carried out, as in the case of intraEuropean monetary co-operation, by restricted bodies, the Steering
Board for Trade and the Committee for Invisible Transactions, organs
composed of seven members, each of them chosen for his expert
knowledge by the OEEC Council on the nomination of his government.
The action of the OEEC for the liberalisation of trade consisted
essentially in the dismantling of quantitative restrictions which hampered the intra-European intercourse of goods. By the continuous
adaptation of the trade provisions of the Code of Liberalisation"8 to the
improvement of the member countries' economic situation in general and
their balance of payments in particular, the OEEC could reach the point
where in fact nearly ninety-five per cent of members' imports on private
account 19 were liberalised.
In reducing restrictions on invisible transactions,2 that is, on
services, tourist expenditures, payments of profits and dividends, and
related operations, the OEEC began in i95o by a standstill-a
" See Supplementary Protocol No. 4 to the EMA, the two last recitals of the preamble
of the EMA as amended by that Protocol and paras. 18, 77-79 of the Report of the
Preparatory Committee of the Conference on the Reorganisation of the OEEC, as

printed in a brochure of the OEEC, Paris, December,

196o, THE OROANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 25-83 [hereinafter cited as Blue Paper].

The report [hereinafter cited as PC Report] is reprinted in Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, Background Documents Relating to the Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development, 87 th Cong., ist Sess. (1961), at i [hereinafter cited as Back.ground Documents].
"originally adopted as CODE OF LiBE ALISATION OF TRADE as a Decision of the

OEEC Council C(5o)258 on August iS, 595o. The trade part of this Code was not
retained by the OECD; cf. PC Report paras. 58-71.
I'Cf. ANNUAL ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE OEEC at para. 36, C(61)xx6, August
28,

961.

" For an up-to-date description and analysis of the work of the OEEC in this field
see LIBERALISATION OF INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS AND CAPITAL MOVEMENTS BY THE
OEEC 17-29, Paris, March z961 (OEEC).
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decision of the OEEC Council that its members should not impose
new restrictions on invisible transactions. In June, 1955, it was decided to free, beginning the following November, all invisible transactions unless a member state expressly lodged a reservation against
a specific item in a list of invisible transactions which would exempt
that state from liberalising it. By the annual examination of these
reservations and the enlargement of the list of transactions, the OEEC
has achieved a large measure of freedom for intra-European intercourse in this sector and has whittled down existing restrictions which
were still maintained by virtue of the reservation procedure."
A start into the liberalisation of capital movements was made in
December, 1959, by means of essentially the same technique by the
same body, the Committee for Invisible Transactions. The Code of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements of December 4, 1959, 2" embodied
all obligations of, and recommendations to, member countries within
this field. Like the Code of Liberalisation, it consisted of a set of
general undertakings and procedural rules to which was annexed a list
setting out the detailed commitments with respect to which reservations
could be lodged.
Another adaptation of the OEEC to the changing requirements of
its members occurred in the operational fields of productivity, training
and use of technical and scientific personnel, and nuclear energy.
Chronologically, the first of these subjects to be dealt with was productivity through the creation of the European Productivity Agency
(EPA) in 1953. That institution was devoid of legal personality, as
it was an operational branch of the OEEC which alone had legal
capacity. Under the authority of the OEEC Council, the Governing
Body of that agency and the Secretary-General of the OEEC 3 were
responsible for the operation of the EPA, which implemented its annual
programs 2 4 through projects adopted by the Governing Body. These
projects were of two kinds, either providing continuing services, such as
productivity films, library services, exchanges of documentation and
periodicals, or entailing specific action to meet non-permanent needs,
such as lectures and symposia on specific aspects of productivity, missions
of European experts to the United States and other tasks of a short" Code of Liberalisation, Parts II, III, V, VI, VII, Annexes B and C.
2 Council Decision C( 5 9 ) 244(Final) of December 4, 1959, as amended.

2

Cf. Amended Constitution of the EPA adopted as OEEC Council Decision

C(57)17o of July z6, 1957, arts. 3-7.
2
"Id. arts. 2(d), 4 (b)(c).
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term nature. The work of the EPA enters into the context of continuity as it attacked the problem of economic development from the
technological angle25 when sizable achievements in the field of payments, trade and invisible transactions had already been accomplished
and when technical adaptations were called for to increase the speed
and the volume of the European recovery.'
In its non-regulatory activities, the European Nuclear Energy
Agency (ENEA), the operational arm of the OEEC in the field of
nucleonics, has brought about one of the most important achievements
in the law of international public services.27 For the first time, ENEA
applied the idea of joint undertakings in the field of nuclear energy. 8
Again, ENEA, like EPA, has no legal personality of its own, but is
only an organ in a specific sphere of action of the OEEC, which alone
has legal capacity under international law and the municipal law of
member states. By contributing forcefully to the development of the
peaceful uses of the atom in the member states of the OEEC, ENEA
has contributed considerably to the maintenance of the OEEC as a useful instrument for European economic development and the adaptation
of that organisation to new tasks. It was continued as part of the
structure of OECD.'
Constructed along basically the same organisational lines as the
EPA, the Office for Scientific and Technical Personnel (OSTP) has
been, since I958,,' ° the institutional expression of the OEEC's desire
to cope with Europe's shortage of scientific and technical manpower.
It is too early yet to make a complete assessment of these efforts, since
the projects of the OSTP are by their very nature destined for longterm effect. Suffice it to say that the member governments consider
51. 4 th recital of preamble: "the need to promote an expanding economy as the
.
source of economic strength. ....
" The EPA did not survive the coming into force of the OECD Convention. PC
REPORT 38-40. The text of the PC REPORT may be found in OEEC, BLUE PAPER.
" The regulatory work of the ENEA was-formally--an undistinguishable part
of the acts of the OEEC, as it took the form of decisions, resolutions and recommenda-

tions adopted by the Council of the OEEC which itself created the ENEA by its
Decision C( 5 7)2 5 5 of December 17, 1957.
" For an assessment cf. Hahn, International and Supranational Public Juthorities,
26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 638 (1961), and the author's article on ENEA in i
WORTERBUCH DES V6LKERRECHTS 471-73 (.96o).
.8, 55.
' See PC REPORT

oThe constitution of the OSTP was adopted as Council Decision C(58) 13o(Final)
on June i9, 1958.
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these activities as particularly promising, evidence being the large
financial resources allocated to this office before the coming into force of
the OECD Convention and the large allocations to the committees which
since have continued these tasks."1
To cope with the problems of inland transportation, the European
Conference of Ministers of Inland Transport (ECMT) was established
by a Protocol of October 17, 1953.V 2 It is composed of all members
of the OEEC and, since 1955, Yugoslavia. The United States is
represented by an observer and kept informed of its proceedings. The
ECMT comprises a Council of Ministers and a Committee of Deputies.
The Secretariat was under the sole operational control of the Conference, but "administratively integrated" with the OEEC Secretariat.
The OEEC paid the salaries and the expenses of the ECMT and
provided facilities for its meetings when they were held in Paris at
OEEC headquarters. 3 3 It had been agreed between the OEEC and the
ECMT that the OEEC would be consulted on all questions of
European inland transportation of general economic importance and the
ECMT would be consulted on questions of inland transportation. 4
This relationship has been maintained since the coming into force of the
OECD Convention. 5
Whereas the ECMT is an independent organisation, the Ministerial Committee for Agriculture and Food (MCAF) formed part of
the OEEC. In addition, meetings of the OEEC Council could be
attended by Ministers of Agriculture. The MCAF was serviced by the
OEEC Secretariat and had no budget of its own.3 6 Like the ECMT,
the MCAF could not adopt a binding decision, but could only agree
on measures to be taken by its members within their national departmental powers. It could initiate measures with binding force by submitting appropriate proposals to the OEEC. The demise of the
OEEC put an end to this institutional arrangement, to be replaced by
a more flexible structure. 7
A further development within the OEEC occurred in its relationship with the Canadian and United States Governments. Not only did
81

See PC REPORT

27.

"8 See text at I EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 473 (1955)Id-. 475, 477 art. 7.

Id. 479 art. xx.
s See PC REPORT

"13!.

"°Cf. Council Decision C(5 4 ) 326(Final) of January 14, 1955.
"PC REPORT
21-23, 25, 26, 88-9z.
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the United States support politically, financially, and ,by the advice of
its officials the activities, of the Organisation from the beginning, in
particular in the fields of payments and productivity and in the overcoming of the shortage of scientific and technical personnel, but the two
North American states also participated in the work of the OEEC as
associate members after 1950.8

With regard to the restricted bodies,

United States participation was institutionalized by express provisions
30
in the rules of procedure of these bodies or their terms of reference.
Nor was the legal and factual position of the United States within the
framework of the OEEC affected by the termination of Marshall Plan
aid in I951-52.40

Though without right to vote, the opinions voiced by the delegates
for the two North American states carried considerable weight, much
more weight than can be explained alone by their status under the Rules
of Procedure of the OEEC. These rules of procedure did not go
beyond permitting United States and Canadian representatives to "attend the meetings" of the organs of the organisation 4 ' and instructing
the Secretary-General of the OEEC to notify the North American
delegations of the dates of such meetings, as well as to provide them
with the agenda and the minutes of those meetings.42 It may sound
over-simplified, but it is probably a correct summary of OEEC practice
that the United States and Canada had, de facto, the same role as the
full members of the OEEC, apart from the right to vote. Yet the lack
of the veto power on the part of the United States and Canada has
furnished them with an excellent occasion to prevent or support votes
of the Council by sheer persuasion. This fact merits all the more
" See Rules 7 & 8 of the RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OEEC (December, 1958),
and Resolution C/M(5o) 9 (Fnal) 83 (d) of 4 April 195o and C(5o) 169(Final) of 23
June 195o.

" European Monetary Agreement, August 5,

2955,

art. xg(d),

2

EUR. Y1.

213,

233 (1957) 5 Art. z(a) (ii) of the Rules of Procedure of the EMA Board of Manage-

menti Code of Liberalisation, July 2o, 2952, as amended July 29, 1955, arts. 3 5 (d)
.(Steering Board for Trade), 39(e) (Committee for Invisible Transactions), 3 EUR.
YB. 283.
"OThe Economic Co-operation Act was abolished by the Mutual Security Act of
2951, ch. 479, § io.(a)(x),
65 Stat. 373, 374, and its functions transferred to the
Mutual Security Agency effective December 3o, 195, pursuant to Exec. Order No.
20300, 16 Fed. Reg. 11203 (295i).
See PRICE, THE MARSHALL PLAN AND ITS

MEANING 161 (x955).
"OEEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule 7 (December,
'2 Id. Rule 8.

9 58).
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respect, as the OEEC legally has not pierced the "twilight of unanimity,"4 but has rested by and large within its limits.
The unanimity rule itself underwent some adaptations which made
it more palatable. While Article Fourteen of the OEEC Convention
established the basic rule that decisions of the OEEC should be taken
"by mutual agreement of all the Members," it did permit exceptions
where the organisation had agreed on other methods of voting or
where a member had made a declaration of non-interest. 4 The former
exception has, for example, been applied by the Council when adopting
certain decisions under the EPU Agreement45 and related provisions of
the EMA.4 Projects of EPA and the OSTP could be adopted by the
Governing Body and the Governing Committee, respectively, by a
majority of its members present and voting though the member in
whose territory the project was to be carried out could object. Furthermore, certain subsidiary committees could adopt procedural resolutions by a majority vote of the members represented on the body
and present.47
Though structurally distinguishable from the plenary bodies in
which these exceptions from the unanimity rule occurred, the Managing Board of the EPU needs to be mentioned in this context also,
as it could, by a majority of four of its members, adopt decisions binding
on all parties to the EPU Agreement concerning the operations of the
Union and its management." The same rule applies to the Board of
Management of the EMA.4 9 Likewise, proposals by the Steering
Board for Trade and the Committee for Invisible Transactions to the
" Jenks, Some Constitutional Problems of International Organisations, z BRIT.
YB. INTr L. I1, 34-36 (1945).
" "Unless the Organisation otherwise agrees for special cases, decisions shall be
taken by mutual agreement of all the Members. The abstention of any Members declaring themselves not to be interested in the subject under discussion shall not invalidate
decisions, which shall be binding for the other Members." Convention for European
Economic Co-operation, April 16, 1948, art. 14, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 98 (Supp.
1949), x EUR. YB. 231, 237 (1955).
"Agreement for the Establishment of a European Payments Union, June 30, 1954,
art. 19, 2 EUR. YB. 363, 387 (956).
"European Monetary Agreement, August 5, 1955, art. 18, 3 EuR. YB. 213, 231
('957).
'7 OEEC RULES oF PROCEDURE, Rule 20(b), 22(b) and z6 (December, 1958).
48 Agreement for the Establishment of a European Payments Union, June 30,
1954, art. 2o(f)-(h), 2 EUR. YB. 363, 389 (1956).
"European Monetary Agreement, August 5, I955, art. i9(f)-(h), 3 EUR. YB.
213, 233 (1957).
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Council could be adopted by a majority of not less than four members
of the respective body. 50
Thus even the highest of norms in the hierarchy of the law of the
OEEC has undergone the effect of time and been adapted to the exigencies of politics and the intra-European economy.
II
OECD CONVENTION
One might look at the OECD Convention as a recognition that the
objective of the predecessor organisation has been attained.61 Though
that statement is not incorrect, it does not reflect the width and the
depth of elements extraneous to the OEEC which contributed to its
death and the birth of the OECD. The beginning of the end of
OEEC was the hesitation of its members to settle the economic controversy between "The Six" and "The Seven," or more specifically, to
come out with a concept for a general European free trade area which
was acceptable to the member states of the European Economic Community" = as well as to those which later became the contracting parties
to the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA)."s That stage had been reached, at the latest, in the second
half of December, 1958, when the hope of arriving at a mutually
acceptable compromise disappeared.54 Nevertheless, it lasted until
December 21, 1959, before the reform of the OEEC became, in those
HISTORY OF THE

"Code

of Liberalisation, July 2o, 1951, as amended July

39(g), 3 EuR. YB. 255,

283

29,

1955, arts. 35(f,

(z957).

" "La disparition de I'O.E.C.E. n'est pas la sanction d'un 6chec, mais au contraire
d'une riussite." French Government, Exposi des Motifs op. cit. infra notes 54, at z.
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on Executive E, Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 1,
87 th Cong., ist Sess. i (1961). For a similar view, see the oral expos6 by M. Val6ry
Giscard d'Estaing, Secr~taire d'Etat aux Finances, before the French Assembl6e Nationale,
Journal Ofliciel of May 19, 596i, DEB'rAS PARLEMENTARIES 84-7-50.
"The treaty establishing the European Economic Community was signed on
March 25, 1957.
"Signed November zo, 9S59; English and French text in Cmnd. 906, 1o6 (196o)
Treaty Series No. 30.

" For a concise account of the elements which decided the outcome of the negotiations, see the Swiss Message du Conseil fidiral sur la participation de la Suisse h
l'association europienne de libre-ichange of February 5, 196o (Print No. 7957) (1-7),
and the French Government's Exposi des motifs concerning the OECD Conveition,
Assembl~e Nationale, iire Legisl., 2ime Session Ord. de x96o-6z at 5-9 (Print No.
51o).

See also CAMPS, THE FREE TRADE AREA NEGOTIATIONS passim. The documents

which played a part in the negotiations are collected in the British Command Paper,
CMND. 641, published in January, 1959.
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terms, part of the agenda of European and North American statesmen, economists and legal technicians. On that date the heads of
state and Government of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States agreed to review the methods
for continuing consultations dealing with the development of less de:veloped countries and -the pursuance of trade policies directed to the
sound use of economic resources and the "maintenance of harmonious
international relations, thus contributing to growth and stability in
the world economy and to a general improvement in the standard of
living. 15 5 Following this decision, representatives of all the member
states of the OEEC, of Canada and the United States, as well as
representatives of the European Economic Community, in January,
196o, approved a scheme for the reform of the OEEC, which instituted
a group of four experts to make a detailed report on the subject,
established the Development Assistance Group to consist of the representatives of eight capital exporting countries, and which set up a trade
group for the study of the special problems resulting from the existence
of the EEC and the EFTA within the framework of OEEC and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 8
In May, i96o, a conference of high-ranking government officials
considered the report of the group of four experts and referred it fofurther study to a working party of representatives of the twenty
governments and the European Communities. In the consideration of
that report, particular emphasis was to be placed on the choice of
machinery for the maintenance of OEEC acts on the coming into force
of the OECD, and on the designation of the OEEC acts which
should be so retained. At the same time the draft convention on the
OECD which the group of four experts had submitted to the May
Conference" was to be reviewed and the machinery to be proposed for
the maintenance of OEEC acts on the taking effect of that convention
was to be fitted into its procedural pattern.
At a ministerial conference in July, i96o, agreement was reached
on the thus far controversial establishment of a trade committee.5
This politically incisive problem having been settled, the conference
proceeded to the designation of a new Secretary-General for the
"'Cf., Blue Paper, Doc. No. x, at 91.
Id. at 93-97.
' Docs. Nos. 2-4.
'7 Doc. No. 5-Resolution Pertaining to the Reconstitution of the O.E.E.C. Id. at
99.

' Resolution on Trade, July

PAPE

at 103.

23,

96o (Doe. No. 7, OECD(6o) 9(Final)), BLUE
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OEEC, who at the same time, was named Secretary-General Designate
of the OECD6 9 Furthermore, a Preparatory Committee was established which, under the chairmanship of the new Secretary-General
of the OEEC, should complete the draft convention on the OECD, the
supplementary instruments relating thereto and should finalize the
machinery for the choice of OEEC acts to be retained on the coming
into force of the OECD Convention.60 Between the beginning of September, 196o, and the signing of the OECD Convention on December
14, I96O, the Preparatory Committee completed its tasks successfully

and submitted for signature by the ministers, apart from the convention
itself, Supplementary Protocol One concerning the Representation of
the European Communities in the OECD, Supplementary Protocol Two
on the Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities of the OECD in member
and non-member countries, a Protocol on the Revision of the OEEC
Convention of April i6, 1948, and a Memorandum of Understanding
on the Application of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention."'
III
OEEC AND OECD
of the organisaas
the
transformation
precedents
Influenced by such
tion of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 into WEU and especially the revision of the ILO Convention, the draftsmen of the OECD Convention
desired to affirm the identity ratione personae of the OEEC and OECD,
but preferred a different principle, namely that of selection to the
wholesale continuity ratione materiae. Therefore, it was provided that
upon the taking effect of the 196o Convention, the "reconstitution"
of the OEEC should take effect and the legal personality possessed by
the OEEC should continue in the OECD."
For political rather than legal reasons, the form of an autonomous
CONTINUITY RATIONE PERSONAE AS BETWEEN

CoThe resolution

appointing Mr. Kristensen Secretary-General of the OEEC
196o, was adopted on July a8, x96o. Resolution of the

effective as of September i,

OEEC Council, July 28, 196o (C(6o)I77).

Mr. Kirstensen's nomination as Secre-

tary-General Designate of the OECD had been decided five days earlier. See Min-isterial Resolution, July z3, 196o (OECD/M(6o) 2) ; cf. OBEC Press Release, July 28,
196o (Press/A(6o) 3s).
" Resolution Relating to the Preparatory Committee, July 23, :96o (Doc. No. 6,

OECD(6o) (Final)), in BLUE PAPER at 1ox.

" BLUE PAPER at 9-22. With the exception of the protocol on the revision of the
OEEC Convention, a reprint of these instruments may also be found in 107 CONc. REc.
3924-26, 3934- (daily ed. March 16, 1961).
"' Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

art. 15, in BLUE PAPER at 13.
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new convention, together with a protocol revising the OEEC Convention, was chosen to bring about the change, though an instrument
of amendment might have sufficed as in the 1945-46 reform of the
ILO."
Yet it was on legal grounds that in the early stages of the OEEC
reform the solution was adopted "which does not terminate the OEEC's
existence as a legal entity, but endows it with a new constitution."8 4
There were evidently powerful arguments in favor of a new organisation and the abolition of the old one. The membership of the future
organisation would not be the same, its principal tasks might be
different, and all decisions and recommendations would lapse if they
had not expressly been re-affirmed by the council of the future organisation. Still, this solution was considered as creating serious legal
difficulties. It was argued that the property of the OEEC, its leases,
the Staff Provident Fund, any assets held by it on its own behalf or on
behalf of others, and its obligations under treaties and other agreements65 would not have been automatically transferred to the future
organisation. Likewise, it was pointed out that the assets of the
European Fund which, under the EMA, were held in trust by the
OEEC 8 would not have devolved ipso jure on the OECD and the
credits granted by the fund would not automatically continue to be
available. Finally, it was suggested that the termination of the legal
personality as such would not entail the automatic release of the staff,
since neither continuity ratione personae, nor discontinuity of the OEEC
would free the OEEC from the obligation to bring about the dismissal
by a notice of termination in each individual case in accordance with the
Staff Regulations and Rules of the OEEC"
C" The main reason for the choice of a new convention was probably that the
Canadian and U.S. negotiators advocated it on the ground that public and parliamentary
opinion would find it more palatable to enter into an organisation new in name andat least partly-in fuctions, than to accede to an already existing organisation whose
law, institutions, customs and practices had developed before the two North American
States had changed their status from that of associate members to members. A similar
view seems to underlie the declaration by Ambassador Tuthill, Head of the U.S. delegation to the OEEC on April 21, 196i. 16 EUROPA ARcHly 249 (1961).

"44 Remodelled Economic Organisation, A Report by the Group of Four, I 17o, at

S5 (196o) [hereinafter referred to as REPORT OF THE Fou].
5
I.e., arrangements which, if concluded by an ordinary subject of municipal law,
would be considered as private law contracts, involving e.g., supplies of stationery,
water, and electricity.
"CCf. Elkin, 7 EUROPAN YEAR3OOK 148, 154 (g6i).
" In spite of this array of reasons in favor of continuity ratione personae, it is
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For "reasons of legal convenience" and in order "to avoid . . .
technical complications,"" 8 the reconstitution of the OEEC was chosen
as the solution. The word itself has in common usage, as well as in
legal language, more than one meaning. It is perhaps with that
diversity in mind that the term was chosen to define an operation which
was to ensure to the European members of the OECD the continuation
of their fruitful co-operation within the framework of the OEEC, but at
the same time permitted the executive branches of the Canadian and
United States Governments to present the reconstitution of the OEEC
as a fresh start. That could be done in good faith, since the textbook
definition of reconstitution as a legal term is "a fresh constitution" 9
and the word is also used to denote the act of providing a new consti'tution.70 Since in the law of private associations and corporations
a reform of the basic instrument does not necessarily imply the replacement of one legal personality by another, and, in constitutional law
proper, such a reform never involves succession, though it may have
considerable repercussions on the functions and the form of governments, -the term "reconstitution" has been used quite appropriately to
signify identity ratione personae between OEEC and OECD. The
legal personality of the former is continued in the OECD, the functions of which need not, and do not, coincide with those of the OEEC
because the continuity ratione materiae as between the two organisations
is subject to severe limitations. The "practical advantages" for which
the maintenance of the legal personality was chosen in no way diminishes the significance of the constitutional reform with regard to
the tasks of the new organisation.7 1
These practical advantages present themselves at various turns,
but foremost with respect to the property of the OEEC, treaties concluded by it or under its auspices, and agreements of the OEEC other
than treaties and relations with its staff.
As regards the property of the OEEC, chattels and immovables,
no question of devolution, succession or transfer of title will arise since
-suggested that the arguments against succession were, from a practical point of view,
possibly not as weighty as they were considered to be by the group of four experts.
The complications of the procedure required to ensure a selective continuity ratione
materiae were at any rate much More considerable than was expected at the outset of
the negotiations.
"SREPORT OF THE FOUR, supra note 64 at 55, para. 173.
" SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1955).

1 Ibid.
71

REPORT OF THE FouR, supra note 64 at

56, para.

175.
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its legal personality continues in the OECD and the latter will have
the rights and obligations the OEEC had. Nevertheless the French
public registers in which the OEEC had been entered as the owner of its
headquarters premises were amended to take account of the change in
7

name. Ia

As regards treaties, two groups must be distinguished: those to
which the OEEC was a party and those which were concluded under
its auspices and relating to it. Treaties concluded by the OEEC 72 were
not affected by the transformation of OEEC into OECD. They continue to apply to the latter as they did to the OEEC and it would,
therefore, be futile to consider here the problem whether and under
what conditions treaties concluded by an international organisation
survive the extinction of that organisation and whether it is conceivable
that rights and obligations provided for in such a treaty might devolve
in whole or in part on the former member states of the organisation."
"'A notarial act to this effect was signed by Deputy Secretary-General Adair on
December 6, 1961, which specifies: "Lequel (scilicet 'Secr&aire g~n~ral adjoint de
l'O.C.D.E.'), is-qualiti, a . . . d6clar6 . . . confirmer les 6nonciations . . . concernant
sp~cialement le changement de denomination de l'Organisation . . . sans que cette
modification ait entraini de changement dans la personne morale de ladite Organisaion .... Mention des pr~sente est consentie partout o besoin sera ... Une expedition
des prisentes sera publi~e au troisi~me bureau des hypothiques de la Seine ....
"
(Emphasis supplied.)
" On the treaty making power of the OEEC cf. Elkin, The Organisation for
European Economic Co-OperationIts Structure and Powers, 4 EURO'EAN YEARBOOK 96,
133 (1958), who provides examples for its exercise. The Preparatory Committee had
before it a list of treaties and contracts of the OEEC remaining in force after June 30,
1961, i.e., the end of the OEEC fiscal year in which the signature of the OECD
Convention occurred. Doc. OECD (6o)22 (1960).
"These questions are most likely to arise in cases of automatic succession. The
more far-reaching problem, whether a constitutional reform or "reconstitution" which
purports in terms to leave the identity ratione personae of an organisation untouched,
may nevertheless change that entity ratione materiae so incisively that contracting parties
to treaties concluded with it could claim that the arrangement had lapsed because the
ratione materiae with which they were dealing, other than the original subject of international law, did not arise as a contentious matter in the case here at issue. The Board
of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency considered the problem at its
286th meeting on March 5, x962 in view of the agreement of that agency with the
OEEC of September 30 and November 24, 196o. The Board noted that the Act of the
OEEC Council approving the agreement [C/M (6o) 2o] had been retained by the OECD
and that, accordingly, no further confirmation was needed. Yet, it is suggested that the
views of the Board were as well influenced by the fact that the functions of the OECD in
respect of the peaceful use of nuclear energy-to which the arrangement with the OEEC
related-and the pertinent organs were the same as those of the OEEC at the time of the
agreement's conclusion. The same consideration may be held to be responsible for the
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Similarly, treaties concluded under the auspices of the OEEC, i.e., those
to which that organisation had invited signature by a recommendation
of its Council, such as the EMA, various treaties concluded in the field
of nuclear energy, 74 and the Turkish Debt Agreement,"; are unaffected
by the OEEC reform. Provisions of those treaties which provide for
action by the OEEC bind the OECD in the sense that obligations and
rights incumbent on the OEEC by virtue of such provisions must be
exercised in the future by the OECD.
Finally, on legal grounds, it would not even be necessary to substitute for the references to the OEEC and its organs references to the
OECD, since Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention provides that on
its coming into force, the aims, organs, powers, and name of the OECD
shall be as provided in the OECD Convention. This entails replacement of the present references to the OEEC and its organs by references to the OECD.76 If, nevertheless, formal amendments of such
nature were made to the treaties here at issue, they were a matter
of factual convenience but not of legal necessity. Therefore, they are
declaratory of, and not constitutive for, the modifications for which
they provide.
As regards agreements other than treaties, i.e., consensual arrangements between the OEEC and the subjects of municipal law which
do not involve the display of the attributes of an international person7 they are likewise unaffected by the
ality on the part of the OEEC,"
transformation of OEEC into OECD. By and large, the same rules
apply as in the case of treaties concluded by the OEEC.
However, at this stage it should be emphasized that continuity of
maintenance of the agreement with the Bank for International Settlements of March 6
and 13, 1959, and December x6 and a, 1959, on the functions of that bank in the framework of the EMA, the arrangement with the European Conference of Ministers of
Transport of January 2o and February 1, 1954, and the agreement with the F;ench
Government on the Application of French Social Security Legislation to the Staff of the
Organisation of March 5, 19597

" Legal Series of the International Atomic Energy Agency, No.

AGREEMENTS,

187-258

(VIENNA

1959)5

IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

CONVENTION

(OEEC

"Agreement of May 11, 1959, on
(OEEC Publication) (1959)-

Publication ss68o)

COMMERCIAL

z, MULTILATERAL

ON THIRD PARTY

LIABILITY

(196o).

DEnS OWED nY

RESIDENT

F

TURKEY

"eSECOND REPORT OF THE LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE TO THE PREPARATORY COM-

(OECD/P/ 3 3 ).
KASME, LA CAPACITE DE LIORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES DE CONCLURE DES

mITrEE, para. 7
7

TRAITES 13-37 (196o); Mosler, Die Erwmeiterung des Kreises der V5lkerrechtssubiekte,
22

ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES

(1962).

OFFENTLICHES

RECHT UND

V6LKEERRECHT

t
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rights and obligations deriving from treaties and other agreements of
the OEEC prevails without limitation in the relationship between
the OECD and the other parties to the arrangements only. Since these
arrangements involve financial obligations on the part of the OECD,
their fulfillment requires within the organisation an authority to disburse monies accordingly. That authority could only be derived from
a decision of the Council adopted under Article Twenty of the OECD
Convention, unless a budgetary decision of the Council of OEEC allocating corresponding amounts had been retained under Article Fifteen
of the OECD Convention. For, each annual budget of the OEEC
and its financial regulations having been adopted in the form of decisions of the OEEC Council, these acts lapse on the entry into force
of the OECD Convention, since they were not recommended for retention under its Article Fifteen. When, therefore, deliberative organs
of the EPA and the OSTP, for example, had, before the coming into
force of the OECD Convention, adopted long-term projects in their
respective fields of activity and the OEEC had accordingly concluded
contracts providing for payments several years after the entry into force
of the OECD Convention only, it was necessary that the Council of
the OECD appropriate the amounts required for these payments in
accordance with the budgetary and financial rules then prevailing. 8
In general, the staff hired by the OEEC was not affected by the
demise of the OEEC and the advent of the OECD as such, since the
entry into force of the 196o Convention did not automatically terminate
contracts or alter the terms of appointment set out therein. On the
other hand, nothing could stop the Secretary-General of the OECD
from making use of the possibilities for the release of staff which the
staff regulations offered where he considered that this was required by
changes in tasks and objectives."'

"This

procedure is likely to involve a redistribution of the financial burdens

ensuing from these operational activities since the United States, on the coming into
force of the OECD Convention, no longer made grants in support of such tasks covering a considerable part of the expenditure involved as it did before that date, but restricted itself to the contributions due from it as a member state.
" REPORT OF THE FOUR, A REMODELED ECONOMIC ORGANISATION,
177, at 56

(ig6o).
But cf. i Bulletin de la Ffdfration de la Fonction Publique Europienne at 5
(No. 2, July x962): "In its recommendation No. 310, the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe expresses concern at the treatment accorded to officials who may be
dismissed when their posts are abolished as a result of reorganisation of European institutions. Citing a particular case, the Assembly deplores the inadequate compensation paid
to those who lost their jobs when OEEC became OECD."
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This array of consequences flowing from the identity ratione personae as between the OEEC and OECD raises the question as to the
legal significance of the Protocol of December 14, i96o, on the Revision of the OEEC Convention of 1948. That protocol was signed by
the eighteen member states of the OEEC only, since the 1948 Convention remained for Canada and the United States, non-members of
the OEEC though closely associated with it, a res inter alios acta
in spite of their factual and legal links with that organisation. It is
suggested that this protocol was concluded largely for the purpose
of meeting the requirements of the constitutional law of certain participating states. Purely from the point of view of international law,
the protocol might have been avoided.
If the aims, organs, powers and name of the OEEC are those
provided in the OECD Convention once that treaty has entered
into force and the reconstitution of the OEEC has thus taken effect,"'
it would be difficult to conceive that the OEEC Convention could
remain unaffected by this change, since originally and until the taking
effect of the OECD Convention, the aims, organs, powers and name
so modified had been specified in the OEEC Convention of April 16,
1948. To this end, the Protocol of December 14, I96O, stipulates
that the 1948 Convention is replaced by the constituent instrument of
the OECD. A separate arrangement of the eighteen members of
OEEC was required to revise the 1948 Convention because several
member governments of the OEEC had found it incompatible with
their constitutional rules to bring about that revision by implication
were anxious to present the
only, while the United States and Canada
8
OECD Convention as a new venture. 1
Apart from these elements of substantive law, it may be noted in
passing that procedurally, the provisions of the protocol on the coming
into force of the revision of the OEEC Convention and the cessation of
"°CONVENTION ON THE

ORGANISATION

FOR

ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION

AND"DE-

VELOPMENT [OECD] art. iS (196o).
"The analogy to the transformation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation into the
'Western European Union [WEU] (1955) is not in point here. It is true that the
revision of the 194-8 Brussels Treaty was brought about by a protocol concluded by the
original signatories only and allowing for the accession of Germany and Italy, and
not by an international act to which these two states were parties. But that protocol
specified all amendments required and set them out textually whereas the Protocol
on the Revision of the OEEC Convention was concluded among the eighteen OBEC
members and yet refers for all particulars of the constitutional reform to a treaty concluded among twenty nations, eighteen of which are identical with the parties to the
protocol.
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the latter specify only what Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention
already dearly implies, namely that the revision of the OEEC Convention shall take effect with the entry into force of the OECD Convention and that as from that time the OEEC Convention ceases to have
effect with regard to the eighteen members of the OEEC. This parity
of legal prescriptions was, however, inevitable once a separate protocol
on the revision of the OECD Convention had been accepted as the
only feasible solution.

IV
LEGAL CAPACITY: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE

OECD

IN MEMBER AND NON-MEMBER STATES

Once it is accepted that, ratione personae, OECD is identical with
the OEEC, it is understandable that the privileges and immunities of
the OEEC have by and large devolved on the OECD. To be sure,
nothing would have prevented the member states of the new venture
from agreeing otherwise. And yet by a mere chance, which is in line
with the innate logic of the factual situation, its legal assessment in
the OECD Convention and the Report of the Preparatory Committee,
the legal capacity, and the privileges and immunities of the OECD are
almost the same as those accorded to the OEEC. This is provided for
in Supplementary Protocol No. Two of the OECD Convention. In remaining faithful to the legal position as it prevailed during the lifetime of the OEEC, that protocol provides for a system of privileges
and immunities which is probably unique in the law of international
organisations, in that it imposes on the member states three sets of
privileges and immunities for the OECD, its officials, its communications and the representation of members. From the taking effect of
its constituent instrument, the OECD will enjoy:
(a) in the territory of its European members the legal capacity, privileges, exemptions and immunities provided for in Supplementary
Protocol No. One to the OEEC Convention of 1948583
(b) in the United States of America the legal capacity, privileges,
82
PROoCOL ON THE RE~vISION OF THE CONVENTION

FOR EUROPEAN

ECONOMIC

CO-OPEA'ION, art. 2 (1948): Il. This Protocol shall come into force when the
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development comes
into force. 2. The Convention shall cease to have effect as regards any Signatory of
this Protocol when the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development comes into force."
' 88See JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES passim (1961).
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exemptions and immunities provided for in Executive Order
10,133 of June 27, 1950 with regard to the OEECi4 and
(c) in Canada, which had not yet accorded any privileged status to the
OEEC, such legal capacity, privileges, exemptions and immunities
as may be provided for in an agreement on that subject between
the Canadian Government and the OEEC.
It was, of course, understood that in non-member states the legal
capacity, privileges, exemptions and immunities of the OECD would
depend on special arrangements agreed upon with the governments
concerned.
V
THE

PARTICIPATION

EFTA

OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES

IN THE WORK OF THE

AND

OF

OECD

As regards the participation of the European Communities and
of the EFTA in the activities of the OECD, a new approach was
followed. Recognizing that as a result of the foundering of Free
Trade Area negotiations within the framework of the OEEC, two
economic organisations were in existence in Western Europe, those
making the policy decisions wanted to give to the economic union
of the six member states of the European Communities and to their
institutional counterpart, EFTA, equal standing in the bodies of the
OECD.
As regards the European Communities, this was accomplished by
Article Thirteen of the OECD Convention, which deals with representation of these institutions in the OECD, and by Supplementary
Protocol Number One thereto, providing that representation of the
Communities was to be determined in accordance with their constituent
texts and that the Commissions of the EEC and EURATOM, as well
as the High Authority of the ECSC, were to take part in the work
of the OECD. 5 Contrary to what one might surmise on the basis of
"By virtue of the authority vested in me by section i of the International Organisations Immunities Act, approved December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 669) [22 U.S.C.
§ 288 (z95z)], and having found that the United States participates in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation under the authority of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 137) [22 U.s.c. § 1501 (1952)], as amended, and

acts making appropriations therefor, I hereby designate such organisation as a public
international organisation entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities
conferred by the said International Organisations Immunities Act. Harry S. Truman."
15 Fed. Reg. 4159 (1950).

8"s. Representation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop.
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these provisions, the representation of the Communities is not at all
exclusively the task of the Commissions and of the High Authority.
The basic instruments of these supra-national organisations which, under paragraph one of Supplementary Protocol No. One to the OECD
Convention, govern the problem of representation as such, vest, in principle, the Councils of the Communities with the power to decide in
each case which organ is to represent the communities-as distinguished
from specific organs of the communities-in their external relations."0
In the light of these developments, the relations of the OEEC with the
three Communities, which by and large were carried on by the Secretariat and the executives of the supranational bodies may require reconsideration.
The participation of the EFTA was ensured in a less solemn
manner.

By a Ministerial Resolution adopted on July 23, i96o, the

future member states of the OECD decided upon that matter affirmatively. 7 Though not transformed into a treaty provision, the substantive value of the engagement is equivalent to an international agreement among the states taking part in the resolution, since the effect of
that resolution on each participating government is to bind it as if it had
concluded a treaty.
VI
CONTINUITY RATIONE MATERIAE BETwEEN OEEC AND

OECD

In the hierarchy of norms which govern the continuity ratione
materiae between OEEC and OECD, the second part of the second
sentence of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention stands at the
ment of the European Communities established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome of
i8th April, 1951, and 2 5 th March, x957, shall be determined in accordance with the
institutional provisions of those Treaties.
2. The Commissions of the European Economic Community and of the European
Atomic Energy Community as well as the High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community shall take part in the work of that Organisation." SUPPL. PROT.
No. x.
88 See 18 CARSTENS, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 460, 516, 5i9 (ECSC), 501-2 (EEC); WOHLFARTH, EVERLING,
GLAE NER & SPRUNG, DIE EUROPXIscHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSHAFT, note 2 to art.
116, notes 1S, 17 and 23 to art. 228, note 3 to art. 231 (196o) ; See also, Pescatore Les
Relations Extirieures des Commnunautis Europiennes, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 8-238
(t961, II).
"Doc. No. 9, Resolution concerning the Participation of the Secretary-General
of the European Free Trade Association in the Work of the O.E.C.D,, OECD
(60) 1s(Final), BLUE PAPER at 107.
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summit. In specifying that acts of the OEEC require the approval of
the Council of OECD in order to be effective after the coming into force
of the OECD Convention, the provision subjects the continuity of
functions between the two institutions to the choice of the OECD
Council. In other words, article fifteen, while affirming without restriction the identity, and therefore continuity, ratione personae between
OEEC and OECD, subordinates the continuity rationae materiae to
the rule of selection.
This is all the more valid since, apart from those relating to the
distribution of United States aid, the functions of the OEEC had been
only vaguely described in the 1948 Convention and had been defined
with precision only in subsequent enactments of its Council and, under
its authority, of subsidiary bodies. The great achievements of the
OEEC were thus not accomplished in the execution of specific provisions of the i948 Convention, as would be the case, for example,
with the European Economic Community, 8 but in implementation of
decisions, recommendations, and resolutions of the OEEC Council,
which in that sense, contained the norms determining the policy of
the OEEC. Since in the i96o Convention, the objectives of the OECD
were likewise very broadly defined and did not force the OECD
Council to determine specific terms of reference for the day-to-day work
of the organisation which would in fact provide for the continuity of
functions as between OEEC and OECD, the second sentence of article
fifteen might have permitted the juxtaposition to the continuity ratione
personae of an overt discontinuity ratione materiae, i.e., the complete
discarding of the tasks assumed by the OEEC. If this prospect did
not become reality the result is due to a political decision of the members of OECD, since the legal mechanism provided for in the second
sentence of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention would not have
precluded the elimination of any and all OEEC activities and a fortiori
a radical modification of their formal and procedural aspects.
It is true that from the outset the members of the OEEC, as well
as Canada and the United States, had recognized the desirability of
continuing the functions of the OEEC in fields where no change was
necessary,89 notably the work under the EMA, the liberalisation of
8

" See

9 WOHLFARTH, JAHRMUCH FOR INTERNATIONALEs RECHT 12 (196o).

""Wishing to ensure the continuity of co-operation in the fields where no change
is called for"; Doc. No. 2, Resolution on the Study of the Reorganisatlion of O.E.E.C.,
'approved by Ministers of Members and Associate Members of the O.E.E.C. on January 14, 196o, preamble, par. (b), in OEEC, BLUE PAPER at 93.
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invisible transactions and capital movements90 and in the field of nuclear
energy." But the hammering out of the particulars of this conceptcontinuity ratione materiae with regard to specific subject matters only
-was accomplished in the last stage of the negotiations by the Preparatory Committee with the support of its Legal Sub-Committee. 92
As continuity ratione materiae between OEEC and OECD is based
on the retention of acts of the OEEC after the taking effect of the
OECD Convention, the Preparatory Committee had, in accordance
with its terms of reference, 93 to choose those decisions, recommendations and resolutions of the OEEC which it deemed suitable to maintain. To alleviate that choice, the Secretary-General of the OEEC had
submitted to the Preparatory Committee lists of acts grouped by functional sectors. That method in itself implied a selection since it discarded those acts which, though never expressly repealed, had lost
their object, had become obsolete or for other reasons had no longer
legal effect.
The review of the remaining acts of the OEEC led the Preparatory Committee to classify them into four categories94 according to
their legal standing on the coming into force of the OECD Convention
and the legal machinery employed to secure their continuing validity
after that date.95 That legal standing was determined by the proposals
made to the ministers of the twenty participating nations and set out in
the form of recommendations in the report of the Preparatory Committee, which the Ministerial Conference approved on December 13, 196o.
The first category comprises those OEEC acts which the Preparatory Committee recommended for retention in whole or in part without
modifications of substance. These acts required for the most part
purely formal amendments, as they contained references to bodies of the
OEEC, the functions and powers of which were to be transferred to
analogous bodies of the OECD 6 Some of the acts had become obsolete
'o REPORT OF THE FouR,

"2 Id.

" The

op. cit. supra note 79, at

30-3 1.

at 36.
Legal Sub-Committee produced, in particular, Part II (Introduction to the

Review of the Acts of the OEEC) and Part IV (Comments on the Convention and
Supplementary Instruments) of the PC Report.
03 See Doc. No. 6, Resolution Relating to the Preparatory Committee, July 23,
in OEEC, BLUE PAPER at toi.
PC REPORT Part II: "Review of the Acts of the O.E.E.C.", paras. 41-43.
5
1d. paras. 41-42, at 37.

196o, OECD(6o)1 4 (final),
'+

?'Id. paras. 43-46, at 37-38. These acts were submitted to the Preparatory
Committee with the amendments required after the signature of the OECD Convention
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in part as a result of contrary provisions in subsequent acts of the OEEC
which were also retained or, in consequence of other legally relevant
elements which made them no longer binding. As the Preparatory
Committee was unable to amend the acts in question before the Min-

isterial meeting of December, i96o, the modifications required were
made by the Preparatory Committee between the date of the signature
of the Convention and its entry into force.
It was expressly recognized9 7 that in the absence of an indication
to the contrary in the report of the Preparatory Committee, a retained
act carried with it any reservations concerning it or any of its provisions
made in the course of its consideration by the OEEC Council or another
relevant organ of the OEEC or in the course of its consideration by
the Preparatory Committee and noted in the latter's report. As to
reservations and interpretations made during deliberations of organs
of the OEEC, they were reproduced in their entirety, together with the
acts to which they pertained, in the documents submitted to the OECD
Council in preparation for the latter's action under Article Fifteen of
the OEEC Convention, i.e., the approval of those acts.
The second category comprises those OEEC acts which the Preparatory Committee in its report recommended for retention, while at the
same time proposing substantive modifications. The Preparatory Committee was not able to specify the actual wording for all of these
amendments. In those instances, the Preparatory Committee confined
itself to agreeing on the general sense in which any such act, or part
thereof, should be amended and instructed the Preparatory Committee
to prepare an amended text for approval by the OECD Council.
Experience may prove that mntatis mutandis the ruling made by the
Preparatory Committee on reservations and interpretations attached
to retained OEEC acts applies to the second as it does to acts of the first
category.
In order to give the signatories of the OECD Convention the
"maximum possible degree of certainty as regards the approval" by
the OECD Council9 of OEEC acts which were later classified as bein does. OECD/P(6i) 3, OECD/P(6x)5, OECD/P(6x)io, the first of which documents was referred to in Hearings on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87 th Cong., ist
Sess. at 307-09 (196i).
" TPC REPORT, supra note 94, para. 45, at 37"Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of Article rs of the Convention on the Organisationfor Economic Co-Operation and Development, December
14, 196o (preamble).
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longing to the first and second categories, the Ministerial Meeting
of July 23, i96o, had already instructed the Preparatory Committee

to draft an instrument ensuring that the representatives of the signatories of the convention on the OECD Council would vote for the
approval of those acts in accordance with the recommendations of the
Preparatory Committee.9 9 The form chosen by the Preparatory
Committee for that instrument was a Memorandum of Understanding
on the Application of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention which,
in order to avoid constitutional problems in certain signatory states,'100
specified that its provisions relating to action to be taken before the
voting in the Council, would take effect on signature, while the provisions relating to voting in the Council would take effect for each
signatory upon the entry into force of the OECD Convention as
regards that signatory.
In substance, the memorandum, apart from binding its signatories
to honor the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee, furnished
a procedure whereby Canada and the United States could be relieved
from the commitment to accept acts recommended for retention by the
Preparatory Committee as binding on themselves.' 0 ' To this effect,
the memorandum provided that each of these two states would not be
so bound with respect to any recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, or part thereof, which it specified in a notice to the Preparatory
Committee not later than ten days after the deposit of its instrument of
ratification or acceptance of the OECD Convention. Thereupon any
other signatory could ask for reconsideration of the recommendation
in question, with a view to bringing about a new recommendation of the
Preparatory Committee. Some delegations felt that in the event of a
signatory requesting the reconsideration of a recommendation which
had been the subject of a notification by Canada or the United States,
this request would entail for the other signatories a derogation from
the undertaking to vote for the approval of the OEEC act concerned
if the reconsideration did not result in a new recommendation unanimously accepted by the Preparatory Committee. Other delegations
could not agree to this interpretation. Fortunately, the controversy
"Addendum x to OECD (6o)-st Revision, cited in PC REPORT, supra note 94,
para. 144 , at 73.
"' Memorandum of Understanding; see comment in PC REPORT, supra note 94, para.
147, at 74-

"'1 Memorandum of Understanding,paras. 2-4.
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remained theoretical as Canada and the United States did not make use
of the legal facilities accorded to them by the Memorandum of Understanding. The instance is therefore reported here as an interesting
contribution to the development of the law of international organisation and the law of treaties.
Canada and the United States abided by the terms of the Report
of the Preparatory Committee which indicated the acts which would
not or might not apply to them. Such inapplicability resulted either
from the subject matter of an act,-e.g., it goes without saying that an
act concerning interconnected electrical networks could not apply to
Canada and the United States as well as to the European member states
for geographical reasons-or from specific provisions contained in it or
proposed to be inserted therein by the Preparatory Committee. The indi"
cations to this effect in the report of the Preparatory Committee were considered as equivalent to recommendations of that committee 0 2 and permitted the new members to abstain from voting in the OECD Council
on the acts to be retained without the necessity of invoking the escape
clauses of the Memorandum of Understanding.
Yet that memorandum dealt solely with recommendations of the
Preparatory Committee which related to the retention of acts of the
OEEC and their amendment. It did not even refer to the third
category of acts of the OEEC, those which the Preparatory Committee
did not recommend for retention as such though it agreed that certain
activities, principles or rules provided for therein should be retained or
should be the subject of further consideration under conditions specified
in the Preparatory Committee's report. The recommendations by the
Preparatory Committee to this effect could not come within the scope
of the Memorandum of Understanding since they did not provide for
the retention of acts of the OEEC. Nevertheless, to bind the signatories of the OECD Convention on the policies set out in acts of the
third category and the recommendations relating thereto, the Preparatory Committee, at the suggestion of its Legal Sub-Committee, fell back
-on a technique which had been used by the League of Nations and which
the Permanent Court of International Justice in an Advisory Opinion in
1931, had recognized as a valid basis for the assumption of international
obligations by states."0 3 That is acceptance by the governments con...PC REPORT, supra note 94, para. 46, at 38.

"°Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 42

(1931)

(advisory opinion).
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cerned of a recommendation or resolution of a hortatory nature
1 4
addressed to them by an international body.
As a rule, recommendations by themselves are not binding on the
governments or organizations to which they are addressed.10 5 At the
most, the latter are required to take them into consideration, but
retain freedom of judgment as to action to be taken on them.10 6 For
this reason it appeared necessary that the Ministerial Meeting in approving the report of the Preparatory Committee should accept the
recommendations contained in it and should thereby create obligations
for the participants. This acceptance, which took the form of a ministerial resolution, 0 7 confirmed the determination of governments that
the subsequent work of the Preparatory Committee and the OECD
should be carried on in accordance with those recommendations.'
The fourth category of OEEC acts comprised those which the Preparatory Committee did not recommend for retention in its report.
Those acts lapsed by virtue of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention
as soon as that convention came into force.
It was understood by the twenty governments which were signatories of the OECD Convention that the OEEC would continue to
make decisions and resolutions and to make recommendations in accordance with its 1948 Convention as long as the latter remained in force.
This implied that the problem of continuity ratione materiae might
arise with respect to acts of the OEEC adopted in the interval between
signature and the effective date of the OECD Convention. Consequently, the report of the Preparatory Committee envisaged recommendations which could be made after the signature of the OECD
Convention and the Memorandum of Understanding. 10 9 Thus an act
of the OEEC adopted during that span of time could have fallen into
any of the four categories recognized by the Preparatory Committee,
that is, it might have been recommended for wholesale retention with
rd. at i 16: "The two Governments concerned being bound by their acceptance
of the Council's Resolution, the Court must examine the scope of this engagement."
Ibid.
2052 DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 32-36 (1961).
8
""
See Nagel, Lassen die Empfehlungen der Vereinten Nationen Rackschlsse aud
die Rechtliche Natur der Empfehlungen des Europaratesund des Nordischen Rates Zu?,
30 NoRD.Tss. INT. RET o Jus GE~nauM 5z (i96o).
107Doc. No. so, Resolution Concerning the Report of the PreparatoryCommittee,
December x3, x96o, in BLUE PAPER at io9. "1APPROVE the Report of the Preparatory
Committe and AccEPr the recommendations contained therein." Ibid.
28PC REPORT, supra note 94, paras. 51-5 2, at 38-39.

" Id. 1 145, at 75.
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purely formal amendments, retention with amendments of substance,
discarded as an enactment though activities, principles or rules provided
for therein might be proposed for retention, or it might have been discarded in its entirety. This classification was in each case the work
of the Preparatory Committee, which continued to sift the enactments
of the OEEC adopted after the signature of the OECD Convention.
No problem arose with respect to the position of the two contracting parties within the Preparatory Committee which had not
been members of the OEEC, since that committee was subject to the
rules governing the conduct of any diplomatic conference,110 notably
the unanimity rule. Thus Canada and the United States had a voice
in decisions as to whether an act should be recommended for retention
at all, or should be recommended for retention as among the eighteen
member states of the OEEC but should not apply to either of the two
newcomers.
The question remains whether the acts recommended for retention
and effectively retained by the Council of the OECD in accordance
with Article Fifteen of its convention, continue to be acts of the OEEC,
or became acts of the OECD. The wording of article fifteen leaves
little doubt that the legal basis of their continuing validity on the
taking effect of the OECD Convention is their approval by the OECD
Council."" Yet, since article fifteen likewise specified that acts of the
OEEC are effective as such once they are approved by the Council of
the OECD, there is little doubt that they also continue to be acts of the
OEEC for the purposes of their application and interpretation. This
is in line with the logic of the system on which the transformation of
the OEEC into OECD is based.
The question cannot be deemed immaterial simply on the ground
that ratione personae OEEC and OECD are identical. For the continuity ratione materiae is subject to such limitations as may be enacted
by the supreme body of the OECD."' Once an act of the OEEC has
11"DUNN,

THE PRACTICE

.passim (1929) i Jessup,

I).

AND

PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCES

ParliamentaryDiplomacy, 89 RECUEIL DES COuRS t85 (1956,

1)' "[D]ecisions, recommendations and resolutions of the Organisation for European
Co-operation shall require approval of the Council to be effective after the coming into

force of this Convention."

CONVENTION ON THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CoOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT art. 15.

"' The report of the Preparatory Committee left little doubt that entire sectors of the
activity of the OEEC would be either shelved or considerably revamped; cf. also on
this aspect the French Expose des Motifs, at 8; Rapport . . .par M. de la Malne,
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been approved pursuant to the procedure set out in Article Fifteen of
the OECD Convention, in conjunction with the Memorandum of Understanding on the application of that article, the OECD Council will
be bound to apply it in accordance with the practice of the OEEC. Not
only will the OECD Council be held to honor the interpretations and
reservation with respect to an act, or part thereof, which were expressly
noted in the report of the Preparatory Committee to the OECD Council; but that council will be bound, in applying a retained OEEC act,
to abide by the general rules of interpretation of the OEEC. Thus a
term or device of substantive or procedural law, which had a specific
meaning as a result of thirteen years of trial under the 1948 OEEC
Convention, is likely to be applied in the same sense on the coming into
force of the OECD Convention, unless the convention, the supplementary instruments thereto, or the report of the preparatory committee
provide otherwise.
Nevertheless, there is a method of doing away with this rule by
mutual agreements of all members of the organisation. Once it has
approved the retained OEEC acts in accordance with Article Fifteen
of the i96o Convention, the Council of the OECD may set aside
precedents established by the QEEC and provide for or allow a novel
interpretation of such acts."'
VII
THE IMPACT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES ON THE CONTINUITY RATIONE MATERIAE

BETWEEN OEEC AND OECD
The impact of participation of the two North American states in
the new structure is manifold. Evidently the widening of the membership of the OECD as compared to that of the OEEC is one of the
major elements. It makes the OECD an Atlantic institution. But far

from stopping short at this point, the OECD Convention, in Article
Sixteen," 4 abandons any geographical limitation with regard to adDWputi, Assemble Nationale No. 1178 (Annexe due prodas-verbal de la s6ance du 12
rnai 1g6 Organisation de Coop6ration et de D~veloppement .conomiques) at 6i Avis
pr~sent6 . . . par M. Janvier, DWput6, Assembl~e Nationale No. 119o (Annexe au
proeds-verbal de la seance du 17 mai 1961) at 22i BT-Drucksache 267o at 30.
1.. The question whether the OECD is bound by practice and custom as.developed
within the OEEC and its bodies in interpreting acts originally adopted by the Council
of the OECD and its subsidary bodies is not discussed here.
..."The Council may decide to invite any Government prepared to assume the
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herence of additional states to the new association of nations. Where
Article Twenty-Five of the OEEC Convention of I948" excluded
non-European states from accession, Article Sixteen of the i96o Convention leaves the door open for the adherence of "any government
10
prepared to assume the obligations of membership."'
The factual implications of this metamorphosis of the OEEC are
evident. It is not only because the gross national product of its members
attains 775.5 billion dollars.11 7 The OECD is, moreover, the institutional recognition of the economic inter-dependence of the highly
industrialized states in the Atlantic basin. It may be going too far
to consider that in the OECD, "for the first time, a group of countries
with common interests, beset by common problems, will be free to
discuss their goals and problems within an organisation designed precisely for 'the purpose of finding a rational use of their' scientific and
technical resources,"' 18 since the OEEC in its way had provided such
a forum already. But it is appropriate to see in the OECD one
instrument for the safe-guarding of economic equilibrium in Western
Europe and North America and, by reason of the impact of these regions
on the economic development of the world, for the maintenance of
economic growth generally. A realistic assessment of the political
merits of the OECD may, therefore, recognize the new venture as an
acknowledgment by the member states of their responsibilities vis-a-vis
other nations, especially those which depend for their economic development on aid from Europe and North America.
Though not likewise appreciated by all member states, the considerations put forward by the promoters of the OECD from the beginning seem to have centered around that idea."' They wanted the
Atlantic community to be strong economically in order that it might
obligations of membership to accede to this Convention. . .

CONVENTION ON THE

."

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEvELOPMENT

"[A]ny
...

art. 16.

non-signatory European country may accede to it [the OEEC Con-

vention] by notification addressed to the Government of the French Republic, and with
the assent of the Council of the Organisation."

CONVENTION

ON THE ORGANISATION

.FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION art. 25.

...
In the Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations op. cit.

suPra at 58-59, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, in reply to a question from Senator
Morse whether consideration was given "to inviting, Japan to be a full-fledged member
of OECD," stated: "Japan may become a full member. I think for our part we would
like to see that happen. But it is a question of all other members agreeing."
.. Senate Report 14.

"a Ibid.

...
Cf. statement by Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, Senate Hearing 7, 44, 195;
statement by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Ball, supra 2, 44, 195.
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play its role as a helper and promoter in the economic field vis-i-vis
other nations. The measures designed to facilitate economic intercourse and growth in the member states are primarily, though not
exclusively, intended as a means to that end. This is the impact
which the participation of Canada and the United States has on the
continuity ratione materiae as between OEEC and OECD. Its legal
significance appears from the report of the Preparatory Committee on
the structure and activities of the OECD, which for the initial period
and subject to such modifications as the OECD Council may agree on,
defines in greater detail the objectives of that organisation as they were
broadly set out in the I96O Convention.120
CONCLUSION

Any summary of these reflections on the nature of the transition
from OEEC to OECD which did not distinguish between the legal
personality of the OEEC and its functions would not meet the particular nature of the case.
The provisions of the OECD Convention, of the supplementary
instruments of December 14, i96o, and of the report of the Preparatory Committee, as well as the travaux pr paratoiresof the convention
and its presentation in national parliaments by the representatives
of the executive branches of member governments, leave no doubt that
the OECD is identical with, and therefore continues the legal personality of, the OEEC. The choice of this solution, adopted for
"reasons of legal convenience," 12
' had not only legal consequences of a
technical or procedural nature, but also had considerable political importance, since it binds the OECD to any arrangement of the OEEC
with. third parties, be they treaties, agreements analogous to private law
5
°A matter of predominantly national concern is the extended discussion between
members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the legal spokesman of
the executive branch of the U.S. Government, Professor Abram Chayes, as to whether
the OECD Convention, notably its Articles 5 and 6, might enlarge the powers of the
executive vis-i-vis the other branches of the Federal Government. Professor Chayes'
negative answer is summed up in appendices four and five to the Report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.

Senate Report

1S8-2.

For a penetrating analysis of

the legal and policy problems involved, see Miller, American Participation in Multinational Economic Institutions: A Problem in Constitutional Law and Policy, 1959
WASH. U.L.Q. 325. Miller, Foreign Trade and the "Security State": .4Study in Conflicting National Policies, 7 J. PuB. L. 37 (1958), is a valuable tool for the understanding of, and provides valid arguments against, the views which unsuccessfully
opposed the ratification of the OECD Convention by the U.S.
"" REPORT OF THE FOUR 55,

para.

175-
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contracts, or relationships of a semi-contractual, semi-statutory nature
like the relationship between the OEEC and its staff.
Identity, and thus continuity, ratione personae between OEEC and
OECD, though it goes along with a far-reaching similarity of the
privileges and immunities accorded to the two institutions, must not,
however, veil the far-reaching functional discrepancy between the old
and the new entity. In piercing the veil which the evident identity
ratione personae might throw over the encroachments on the continuity
ratione materiae as between the OEEC and the OECD, it is not intended to belittle the legal merits inherent in this as in any kind of
continuity.
While a wide area of the law of the OEEC-that which concerned
its relations to third parties and was not dependent on unilateral
and discretionary acts of organs of the OEEC-thus comes under the
first sentence of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention, a much
larger portion of the substantive law of the OEEC and, in fact, that
part of its law which constituted for the major part the life of that
organisation, was subjected to the rule of selection.
It would be following the easy method if one were to deal with
the functional aspect of the OEEC-OECD transition by explaining that
the partial lack of topical continuity on the one hand and the addition of
new tasks on the other was nothing more than an adaptation to changing
political and economic circumstances. That pattern of thought may be
appropriate for the political scientist and it is probably susceptible of producing a desirable insight into the maelstrom of economic relations as
one of the prime movers of world politics.
Legally, the evident antimony between identity ratione personae
and the much less pronounced continuity ratione materiae demonstrates
the flexibility of the law of international organisation which, by the
transformation of the OEEC into the OECD, proves that, if it is
admitting analogies from the law of nations, it is susceptible of emptying
them at the same time of their original notional content. As has been
amply shown,122 identity of states implies not only the continuity of legal
personality and the observance of existing international obligations, but
also postulates the principle of, and usually in fact signifies, a farreaching identity of other functions, so far-reaching that the identity
22
1

LAW

M AREK,

passim

IDENTITY
(954);

AND

CONTINUITY

SCHEUNER,

GESETZ ZUR GESAMTDEUTSHCEN

OF

FESTsCHRIFT
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NAWIASKY,
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ratione materiae is a predominant element of continuity as between
states' " even where their territory has been subject to considerable
modifications.
That this does not hold true at all with regard to international
organisations is not only apparent from the outcome of the reform
of the OEEC, but also from the transformation of the Brussels Treaty
into WEU, and to a lesser extent from the revision of the ILO constitution. True, where the device of continuing the legal personality of
an existing organization has been chosen, any outward obligations
assumed at the time of the organisational metamorphosis from one
entity into another must be honored whether they are conventional,
contractual, quasi-contractual or statutory in nature. 2 a
But even in the case of the specialized agencies of the United Nations
which are all linked to that organisation by treaties supposedly determining the short-term and the long-term aspects of their policy, it would be
unrealistic to assume that such outward obligations incurred through
arrangements with one third party went beyond regulating specific
and limited aspects of their functional tasks. This is all the more true
for other outward obligations such as those resulting from headquarters
agreements or from arrangements which are governing what is known
as the "aspect material" of the life of international organisations, i.e.,
the physical and technical facilities that are required for the appropriate
display of their predominant functional assignments. These assignments for the carrying out of which organisations are founded and
exist may, however, be curtailed in so incisive a manner that in the
functional field the legal and factual situation resulting from the reform
of an organisation is equal or substantially similar to the outcome of
'"Ibid.
""s*
But cf. note 73.

Generally speaking, identity ratione personae accompanied by

a far-reaching discontinuity ratione materiae cannot be imposed on non-member states
and other international persons by unilateral decision of an organisation or by way of a
treaty among its members, but requires the consent of third parties. This applies in
particular in respect of treaties concluded by the organisation before constitutional
revision or "reconstitution." Non-member states and other international persons may,
however, recognize continuity ratione personae in spite of far-reaching discontinuity not
only by a positive pronouncement to this effect, but also by conduct which constitutes a
manifestation of assent. If third states or other subjects of interntation law in such cases
do not notify their non-recognition of continuity ratione personae between the signature
or adoption and the coming into force of the legal instrument implementing constitutional reform or reconstitution, they would appear to be estopped from doing so thereafter and would have to accept that they are treated as if they had recognised the
personal identity claimed by the organisation.
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a succession, since the whole direction of an organisation may have been
changed, particularly in objectives and substantive functions.
It is perhaps too early to assess the reform of the OEEC from
this viewpoint, since the broad language of the OECD Convention
permits large-scale continuity rationae materiae even without a formal
recommendation of the Preparatory Committee to this effect. But the
decisions of policy on structure and functions of the OECD set out
in the report of the Preparatory Committee already foreshadow that
this organisation may be quite different from the OEEC in the aims it
actually pursues, in the substantive activities which it displays most
forcefully, and in short, in the objectives it will attempt to achieve.
It is significant in this respect that the procedural vehicle used for
determining the policy of the OECD is one which thus far has been
applied only in cases of inter-organisational succession, notably that
from the League of Nations to the United Nations, that vehicle being
the discretionary decisions of a political body of the new organisation.
Furthermore, the complicated machinery established to maintain part
of the functions of the OEEC, on the coming into force of the OECD
Convention, that is, the Memorandum of Understanding on the
Application of Article Fifteen of the OECD Convention, the report
of the Preparatory Committee and the ministerial resolution transforming the totality of the recommendations set out in that report into an
instrument binding on governments, proves that the freedom of choice
of the OECD Council takes precedence over the principle of continuity
ratione materiae as between the OEEC and OECD with respect to all
activities which the participating governments are not obligated to admit
for maintenance in the OECD.
Substantively, then, the continuity of functions of OEEC, where
it will be ensured by the OECD, is the result of a deliberate choice
and does not ensue automatically from the identity ratione personae
between the two organisations. This tends to prove the proposition
suggested at the outset of this article, that continuity in the law of
international organisations does not necessarily refer, either by parity
of reasoning or law, as it would seem to do in the law of nations, to
identity ratione personae between the international entities concerned.
It has been seen that, with respect to the functions which OECD took
over from OEEC, the participating governments agreed not only on
the continued usefulness of the internationalization of the activities, but
also that the OECD would be the legally, politically, and economically
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appropriate body to exercise them. As for the functions of the OEEC
not carried on by the OECD, such as some tasks of the OEEC relating
to trade which coincided with those of GATT, they were left, in part,
to other international organisations. Other tasks of the OEEC were
re-nationalized, such as some aspects of the OEEC activities in the field
of productivity which were not continued in other international organisations. It is believed that only the latter case is an example of discontinuity in the law of international organisations.
The purpose of continuity in the law of international institutions is
not the maintenance of the existence of an international personality.
It is rather the continued exercise of a given set of functions which
have been internationalized and are required to remain internationalized
in the interest of the states participating in the venture. For that purpose
the functions concerned need not necessarily be exercised by an international institution which is identical with the one intially entrusted with
those tasks. This principle is likely to remain so long as international
organisations are devoid of territorial sovereignty, devoid of that historical bond among their member states and the people living there
which transforms a populace into a nation, and finally, so long as the

very existence of international organisations is at the mercy of their
member states. In other words, the conclusions arrived at herein
will probably remain true as long as international organisations have
their legal basis in rules of international public law and not in the constitutional law of a state-like community resembling a federal union.
Short of this evolution-seemingly Utopan thus far-the legal personality of international organisations is only accessory to the substantive
tasks which alone justify its corporate existence in international law apart
from States.

